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What is Happening to Our Norms Against Racist Speech?1 
 
Once upon a time, not too long ago, it was accepted wisdom that overt racism 
would doom a candidate for national political office in the United States.  Of 
course, there was still a good deal of racism among white Americans—but a 
politician who openly espoused obviously racist views was thought to be 
unelectable.  Elaborate signaling strategies were developed as ways of playing on 
these racist sentiments for political gain without being too obvious about it.  
Political psychologists studied these strategies, though philosophers tended to 
focus on vastly more obviously racist speech, such as slurring or derogatory 
terms. 
 
Just as philosophers were starting to explore these signaling strategies, however, 
something happened.  The world changed dramatically in a way fundamentally 
at odds with the previously accepted wisdom: Donald Trump was elected 
President, despite very overt expressions of racism.  New, and deeply pressing 
questions emerged.  Chief among them, of course, are (1) the descriptive 
question of how what seemed like fixed norms have come to be, apparently, 
smashed; and (2) the vitally important practical question of how we should 
respond to our new reality.  This paper focuses on (1), exploring in depth how 
what political psychologists said could not happen happened.  I will argue that a 
norm against racist speech is still (as I write this, anyway) widely though not 
universally in force; but that it is not nearly as effective as we might have thought 
that it was.  As to question (2): empirical research, and developing events, will 
tell us what the most effective way to respond is.  My hope is that descriptive 
work on question (1) will aid in these efforts. 
 
                                                        
1 I am very grateful to countless people for discussion of these issues, and for 
comments on related papers. I'm especially grateful to Rosanna Keefe for giving 
me feedback on a draft of this paper at an incredibly busy time. 
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1. What used to be accepted wisdom 
1.1 Background: The Norm of Racial Equality and Widespread Racial 
Resentment 
Prior to the Civil Rights movement, national US politicians could run for and 
attain high office while openly espousing explicitly racist policies like 
segregation.  After the Civil Rights movement, Tali Mendelberg maintained, 
this became impossible because most white Americans came to subscribe to 
the Norm of Racial Equality (2001: 81-84).  Mendelberg never states this 
norm, but she notes that it forbade explicit claims of racial genetic inferiority, 
explicit support for legal discrimination or segregation, and explicit 
endorsement of white supremacy.  It also made most white Americans dislike 
people who they saw as racist (Mendelberg 2001: 114), a fact that was not 
lost on politicians seeking their votes. 
 
At the same time, however, most white Americans harbored high levels of 
what psychologists call Racial Resentment (Mendelberg 2001: 117).  Racial 
Resentment is measured through degree of agreement with claims like: “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites.” (Tesler and 
Sears 2010: 19) 
In other words, many of the same people who endorsed the Norm of Racial 
Equality were also likely to agree with the claim above.  This may seem 
puzzling to the reader, as this claim may look quite racist.  However, it serves 
to illustrate just how thin the Norm of Racial Equality is.  Note that nothing in 
the claim above involves explicit claims of genetic inferiority, support for 
legal discrimination/segregation, or white supremacy.   
 If that’s enough to satisfy the Norm, you may be thinking, the Norm is not a terribly effective one.  And you’d be right.  My view is that the best way to 
capture the Norm and its force is to formulate it quite simply as “Don’t be racist” (Saul 2017), where each individual may decide for themself what it 
takes to be racist—and many will set such a high bar that almost nothing 
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counts.  They will, however, reject politicians who seem to them to transgress 
this norm, however they understand it.  And the presence of this norm does 
seem to have constrained political speech (at least until recently).  Politicians 
were wary of it, and sought ways around it.  Two of these ways have been 
widely discussed under the name ‘dogwhistles’ (they are also known as ‘code words’ and ‘implicit political messaging’). 
 
1.2 Two kinds of Dogwhistle 
There were at least two groups of white voters who politicians sought to reach 
with racial messaging, while carefully trying to avoid condemnation by voters 
who subscribed to the Norm of Racial Equality.  The attention in the literature on dogwhistles has mostly focused on the second group, but I think it’s important to 
acknowledge and understand the first group as well.  The first group was people 
who rejected the Norm—those who endorsed white supremacy and explicit legal 
discrimination.  Although these voters were not much discussed in the literature 
on the Norm of Racial Equality, it was always clear that some voters were like 
this. I call them the Unconflicted Racists.  The second group—more the focus of 
discussions of the Norm—were voters who accepted the Norm of Racial Equality, 
but were nonetheless high in Racial Resentment.  I call them the Conflicted 
Racially Resentful.  Oversimplifying somewhat, there were two tools used to 
reach these two groups.  In general, what I call Overt Dogwhistles could be used 
to get the votes of Unconflicted Racists, while the more complicated Covert 
Dogwhistles were needed for the Conflicted Racially Resentful. I explain these in 
the sections below. 
1.2.1 Overt Dogwhistles 
Overt dogwhistles are utterances that convey different messages to different 
audiences.  My focus here is on intentional overt dogwhistles.2  The most simple 
form would be an utterance that imparts a coded message C to the target 
Audience T and a more obvious message O to Audience A.  The coded message 
will usually be one that audience A would find unacceptable. This may be done 
                                                        
2 See Saul 2018 for a discussion of unintentional cases. 
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via any of a number of linguistic mechanisms—ambiguity, implicature, and other 
non-semantic means.3  When this works as intended, each audience consciously 
receives and represents the message intended for them, and audience A is aware 
only of the message intended for them, missing out on the coded message to the 
target audience.  Of course, in real life things are seldom this simple. 
 A classic example of this would be the use of the phrase “I support states’ rights”.  
Many (though not all—see below) Northerners will hear this phrase as simply endorsement of the United States’s federal structure, in which state legislatures 
get to decide on their own laws for certain matters.  But they are not the target 
audience—they’re the audience the coded message needs to be concealed from.   
Most Southerners—the target audience—will hear it as support for at least some 
degree of racism.  This is due to its history as a rallying cry for slave states during 
the Civil War, and for segregationist states during the Civil Rights Movement.  
This meaning is meant to be concealed from the Northerners.  The idea behind 
this strategy is that white Southerners are much more likely to be Unconflicted 
Racists, who will be content to consciously receive a message signaling racism.4 
 
But there are complications: 
(1) Neither Southerners nor Northerners (even white ones) are 
monolithic in their attitudes toward race.  Many white Southerners 
will consciously receive and reject the message of racism.  (But this won’t worry those using this dogwhistle, as long as enough of white 
Southerners receive the message more positively.) 
(2) The Southerners may well also pick up on the meaning intended for 
the Northerners.   But this is not a problem: that meaning doesn’t need 
                                                        
3 See Camp 2018. 
4 Although Mendelberg discusses this example as well, my analysis differs from 
hers. Her focus is exclusively on covert dogwhistles, but I think that once we 
acknowledge the existence of overt dogwhistles, we can see how this category helps us to understand the workings of the “states’ rights” dogwhistle. 
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to be concealed, as it’s an uncontroversial claim about the structure of 
the US federal system.  
(3) Both meanings of “states’ rights” are now relatively widely known.  So 
there are many Northerners who do pick up on the meaning (though 
there used to be fewer).  And, of course, thanks to the internet it is 
becoming harder and harder to direct this kind of messaging to just 
one group.   
 
The internet has provided new opportunities for overt dogwhistles, and also 
added new complexities.  Take the case of triple parentheses.5  These began as an 
overt dogwhistle used on twitter for anti-Semites to signal to each other that 
someone they were quoting or discussing was Jewish.  This was a symbol that 
the general public would not even notice and that search engines would 
overlook—because it took the form of punctuation.6  Using this, those seeking to 
harass Jews could easily do so—and people who had been tagged with triple 
parentheses soon found themselves deluged with holocaust-themed death 
threats.  This, then, was an extremely effective overt dogwhistle: very effective at 
communicating with and mobilizing one group of people, while going unnoticed 
by others.  In an interesting twist, though, two things happened: Jews started 
putting triple parentheses around their names, as an act of reclamation.  And 
non-Jewish anti-racism activists also started using the triple parentheses 
themselves, as an expression of solidarity with Jews and opposition to anti-
Semitism.7  This means that there is now an additional overt dogwhistle meaning 











to the triple parentheses, directed not at anti-Semites but at their opponents.  
Some audiences are aware of both of these meanings, some of just the anti-
Semitic one, and some (probably most internet users) will simply interpret the 
parentheses as a meaningless, odd punctuation choice. 
 
1.2.2 Covert Dogwhistles 
Covert dogwhistles are an altogether murkier phenomenon.  (My focus here will 
be on intentional covert dogwhistles.  For a discussion of unintentional ones see 
my 2018.) The target audience for a covert dogwhistle (the Conflicted Racially 
Resentful) is meant to be affected by it without realizing it.  A covert dogwhistle 
will fail if the target audience becomes aware of what the speaker is attempting 
to do.  Elsewhere, I have categorized these as Covert Perlocutionary Acts, speech 
acts which fail if the intention behind them is recognized (Saul 2018).   
 
The classic example of a covert racial dogwhistle is the Willie Horton commercial, part of George HW Bush’s campaign against Michael Dukakis and 
extensively studied by political psychologist Tali Mendelberg (Mendelberg 
2001).  This commercial made no overt mention of race.  Instead, it described a 
weekend prison release programme that Dukakis had supported, and a prisoner 
who had committed murder and rape while on release.  The prisoner was black, 
and the ad showed an image of his face, while describing the programme and Dukakis’s support for it.  The ad was initially placed in a small local TV market, 
but it (as planned) was picked up by the national news and shown over and over.  
It was not shown as an example of racism, but rather either “negative campaigning” or crime as an issue in the campaign.  During the time the ad was 
shown Dukakis lost his enormous lead, and Bush went on to become President 
(there is still some debate over just how much of a role the ad played). 
 
Mendelberg studied what happened to racial resentment and voting intentions 
among whites during the time the ad was in the news.  She found that there was 
no difference in racial resentment over time.  However, she found that greater 
exposure to the ad led to an increased correlation between voting intention and 
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racial resentment level: the more racially resentful people became more likely to 
vote for Bush.  She also found that there was a point when this trend reversed.  
Shortly before the election, Jesse Jackson started appearing on news broadcasts 
arguing that the ad was playing on racism.  The mainstream media were wholly dismissive of this idea, branding it Jesse Jackson “playing the race card”.  But 
despite the disrespectful reception that Jackson’s intervention received, it was 
highly effective: as soon as Jackson started discussing race in connection with the 
ad, the correlation started falling away.  (In fact, Mendelberg thinks that if the 
election had been held a couple of weeks later Dukakis might have won.) 
 Mendelberg’s influential theory of implicit political communication was based on 
her study of these events.  According to her theory, a covert dogwhistle (in her terminology ‘implicit messaging’) works at an unconscious level, raising racial 
attitudes to salience outside the target audience’s (the Conflicted Resentful’s) 
awareness.  They then bring these attitudes to bear on whatever issue they are considering.  However, it’s vital that the racial aspect of what is taking place remain outside the subjects’ awareness.  If they consciously reflect at all on 
race—even to reject the idea that race has anything to do with the ad—the dogwhistle doesn’t work any more.  This is because the mention of race causes 
them to engage in self-monitoring related to the Norm of Racial Equality.  This 
makes it impossible for racial resentment to become salient without their 
awareness.  Mendelberg and others have argued that this sort of communication 
also occurs in other ways—especially through use of  dogwhistle terms (sometimes called “code words”), which are terms that function as covert 
dogwhistles.8  Again, the presence of these words raises attitudes to salience 
outside of awareness, and brings them to bear on the matter at hand; more 
explicit words tend to backfire, since they run afoul of the Norm of Racial 
Equality.  Dogwhistle terms include ‘welfare’ and ‘public spending’ and probably also ‘terrorist’, ‘extremist’, and ‘radicalisation’, among others. 
 
                                                        
8 See e.g. Horwitz and Pefley 2005. 
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1.3 How to fight dogwhistles 
The accepted wisdom about how to fight dogwhistles has been what you would 
expect, given the way that they work.  Overt dogwhistles are meant to conceal a 
coded message from one part of the audience, because that part of the audience 
would be alienated by it; despite the other part of the audience—the 
Unconflicted Racists—understanding it fully.  The obvious way to fight this is to 
reveal the coded message to the audience it’s meant to be concealed from, thus 
giving this group of people the chance to be alienated by it. Of course, this can fail 
because the coded message is by its nature ambiguous: the speaker may deny 
that they intended the coded message, and the audience may believe that. 
 Covert dogwhistles, according to Mendelberg’s story, are really quite easily 
defeated (though we will soon see that matters are now more complicated).  The 
effectiveness of a covert racial dogwhistle depends on the target audience’s (the 
Conflicted Racially Resentful’s) lack of reflection on race.  All that is needed to 
defuse this is to cause this audience to reflect on race.  The audience may well not consciously realize that race is a key to the dogwhistle’s effectiveness, and 
may even strenuously deny that race has anything to do with it.  But it will 
nonetheless fail to function in the intended manner. 
 
2. What happened 
The events of 2016 have shaken this once widely-accepted picture.  The most 
important such event has been the rise and election of Donald Trump, whose 
utterances have been obviously racist in a way that has shocked many observers.  
According to the once-reigning theory, such utterances should have doomed his 
campaign.  Voters (including the Conflicted Racially Resentful) who accepted the 
Norm of Racial Equality should have been put off by this, and there should have 
been enough such voters to defeat him.   
 So what happened? Why didn’t the Norm of Racial Equality prevent this?  One 
thought would be that the Norm of Racial Equality was abandoned—at least by enough voters to allow Trump to win.  Another would be that Trump’s voters 
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(who after all were less than half of those who voted) never did accept the Norm 
of Racial Equality: they were Unconflicted Racists.  I don’t think either of these is right.  While some of Trump’s voters were surely Unconflicted Racists, many of 
them clearly did accept the Norm—as evidenced by the online discussions 
Trump voters engaged in, reassuring each other that he is not racist (see my 
2017, and below).  They cared about whether Trump was racist or not; but, somehow, they may managed to believe that he wasn’t.  In this paper we’ll look at some explanations for why they didn’t see him as racist.  (A key part of the explanation, we’ll see, is the thinness of the norm ‘don’t be racist’.)  We’ll also 
look at some disturbing evidence that now (a couple of years into the Trump 
presidency) the desire not to be racist may be starting to fade. 
2.1 Obama effect 
One factor that has helped to lay the groundwork for some shifting of norms is, 
ironically, the election of Barack Obama, the first African American President.  
This seems to have brought about a widespread belief that America had broken 
free of the racism of the past.  This belief, in turn, seems to have made many 
white people feel that they do not need to worry so much about racism.  Indeed, 
Valentino et. al. (2018) found in 2010-2012 that it had now become far more 
acceptable to explicitly use racial terms in political advertising than it had been 
before.  So one factor does seem to have been a somewhat lessened concern for the Norm of Racial Equality.  Nonetheless, as we’ll see, there is good reason to 
suppose that the Norm is still widely in effect.  And, importantly, the utterances 




Those who have studied dogwhistles have focused on understanding ways that an utterance can be made which will at the same time (1) play into some people’s 
explicit or implicit racism; and (2) not be recognized as doing so by all.  Another 
way of making racist utterances—while still covering for them—has been 
neglected.  This other method involves making utterance which would normally 
be recognized as obviously racist, but also making an additional utterance which 
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casts some doubt on the idea that the speaker is racist.  This additional utterance 
is what I call a figleaf—because it just barely covers something one is not 
supposed to show in public (Saul 2017).   
 
The success of figleaves is crucially due to two factors: 
1. The Norm of Racial Equality—don’t be racist-- is thin and subject to 
individual interpretation. 
2. Widespread understandings of racism among white people are such that 
it is very easy to dodge worries about racism (Hill 2008).  Key points here 
include the ideas that (a) only people—not utterances—can be racist; (b) 
one is only racist if one consciously endorses negative views based in 
biology about all members of a racial group; and (c) non-racist people 
often say things that sound very racist because their head leads them 
astray, but the truth about them is to be found in their non-racist hearts. 
 
On the widespread view sketched above, which Jane Hill (2008) takes to be white Americans’ folk theory of racism, an utterance only justifies worries about 
racism if the person who made it is racist, and it is very easy to deflect worries 
about racism because of the head/heart dichotomy.  Imagine, then, that a person 
S makes a very racist-sounding statement R.  This alone does not merit a verdict 
of racism on the folk theory.  The only way that it is appropriate to conclude that 
racism is present is by inferring from the fact that S has said that R to the claim 
that S is racist.  All a figleaf needs to do is to block this inference, and any 
concerns about racism can be dismissed.   
 
2.2.1 Synchronic figleaves 
Synchronic figleaves occur at roughly the same time as the utterances for which 
they serve as figleaves.  These will often be made by someone who is worried 
that they may be seen as racist, but they may also occur without that being the 
cause.  One common synchronic figleaf is so common that it is much-mocked, and 
for many people will be completely ineffective as a figleaf:  “I’m not racist, but R”, 
where R is an otherwise obviously racist claim. 
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But some of them are more effective than this, at least with their intended audience.  Donald Trump’s bizarre announcement of his candidacy contained 
such figleaves in one of its most famous passages. 
When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best. They're not 
sending you. They're not sending you. They're sending people that have 
lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with [them]…They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.9 
Most attention quite rightly focused on the fact that Trump suggested that 
Mexicans are rapists.  However, my interest here is in the figleaves.  One figleaf 
plays on the misconception that to be racist one must hate all members of a particular group.  Trump limits his claim to the Mexicans that are ‘sent’, thus 
suggesting that he does not consider all Mexicans to be rapists.  For many, this 
will be enough to undermine the inference from this utterance to the claim that 
Trump is racist.  For those who might still have worries, Trump adds on a further figleaf: “some of them, I’m sure, are good people.” 
 
It is quite obvious that these figleaves did not work for everyone.  A very large 
proportion of the American public took the utterance to be blatantly racist, and to be an indicator of Trump’s racism.  However, there is also reason to believe 
that the figleaves did work for some people.  Trump supporters had online 
discussions amongst themselves about whether Trump was racist, and spent 
time reassuring each other that he was not.  When they did so, they cited the figleaves.  Here’s just one example (for more, see my 2017). 
 
• I didn't hear him say anything racist against any race. What I did 
hear him say is, "Illegal Mexicans bring drugs, crime, and are 
rapists, but I'm sure some are good people." Seriously, whats [sic] 
racist about that? (Dirk, 








This sort of case shows that figleaves played an important role in reassuring 
Trump-supporters that, despite what would otherwise seem to be comments 
indicating racism, Trump was not racist.  The Unconflicted Racists among them 
did not need these reassurances, but the Conflicted Racially Resentful did. 
 
2.2.2 Diachronic figleaves 
 
A diachronic figleaf comes at a different time from the utterance R which 
would otherwise be recognized as obviously racist.  Quite commonly, it can 
even be produced after R, in response to accusations of racism.  It can also be 
produced after a dogwhistle is revealed as a dogwhistle—because at that 
point there is a risk that the racism will be recognized.   
 
The most obvious—and probably least successful—sort of diachronic figleaf is simply to assert one’s non-racism in response to a racism allegation.  
Donald Trump does this quite a bit, asserting in 2017 that he was “the least racist person anybody is going to meet”10; and in 2018 that he was “the least 
racist person you have ever interviewed”11  A more subtle sort of diachronic figleaf involves criticizing someone else’s racism.  Nigel Farage’s criticism of Donald Trump’s Muslim ban proposal arguably falls into this category.12 











2.2.3 Context as Figleaf 
 
There are also figleaves that work by attempting to change the audience’s 
understanding of (otherwise apparently racist) utterance R’s context.  
Context matters for accusations of racism, and the most obvious way to see 
this is to consider the context of an actor in a play.  If, as a part of a play, an 
actor utters a racist utterance, the context (a play) means that the utterance should not be taken as an indication of the actor’s true views.  Convincing an 
audience that a context is not one in which normal inferences hold can 
provide a very effective figleaf.  A good example of this comes from one of Trump’s figleaves for sexism—his assertion that what was heard on the 
Access Hollywood tape was mere ‘locker room talk’, and therefore not to be 
taken seriously.13  (This failed miserably with some of his audience, but 
succeeded with many others.)   
 
2.2.4 Collections of Utterances as Figleaf 
Thus far, my focus has been on single utterances as figleaves.  However, it 
seems that sometimes a collection of utterances may serve as a figleaf.  To accommodate this, we need to only slightly modify our definition of ‘(racial) figleaf’: a (racial) figleaf is an utterance (or collection of utterances) which 
serves to block the inference from an otherwise clearly racist utterance R to 
the conclusion that the speaker is racist. If this makes sense (and I think it 
does), then a collection of utterances may serve as a figleaf. 
 
One way that this sort of figleaf may occur is if the collection of utterances 
provides reason (for at least some) to believe that the speaker’s racist 






utterance R cannot be taken seriously as an indicator of their beliefs.  It 
seems to me that the totality of Trump’s utterances can provide—for some 
audiences, anyway—a figleaf for any individual utterance (and this will apply 
not just to the issue of racism but also to any other).  It is uncontroversial that 
Trump makes a huge number of contradictory and apparently ill-thought-out 
utterances.  This lends support to the idea that Trump’s utterances should 
not be taken seriously.  (How seriously to take these utterances is, notably, a 
topic that comes up over and over again in media discussions.14) And this, in 
turn, offers a figleaf which a significant portion of his audience may accept: 
no individual utterance is an indicator of Trump’s beliefs, because the totality 
of his utterances shows that there is no real relationship between what 
Trump says and what he believes.  (This figleaf will fail miserably for many 
audience members, as the fact that blatantly racist utterances are any part of 
the collection of utterances may be taken as an indication of racism.) 
 
2.3 Immigration’s complex relationship to norms 
Our focus here will be exclusively on opposition to immigration that is based in 
generalised attitudes toward particular groups of people.  Opposition to 
immigration which is based in, for example, a genuine (albeit likely false) belief 
that there is simply no more room in the country should not be taken to be my 
subject matter here.15   
                                                        








15 It is genuinely unclear to me how often something like this is really the 
motivation for anti-immigrant views.  Such a view is often combined with 
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Opposition to immigration has played a key role in the recent rise of the far right 
around the world.  One key reason for the success of this strategy, it seems to me, 
is that anti-immigration sentiment bears a complex relationship to norms against 
racism, one which makes it harder to successfully criticize than 
straightforwardly racist sentiments.  A further complication is the variation in 
sentiments underpinning opposition to immigration: for different opponents of 
immigration, different immigrant groups will be the focus of their concern.16 
 
A case can certainly be made that the sort of anti-immigrant views that are my 
focus are a form of racism.  Both these views and racism are often (though not 
always) based in fear, hatred, or resentment of people who are different from 
oneself.  Tariq Modood (2001) has argued that it is vital to understand what he 
calls cultural racism as a form of racism.  Modood argues that cultural racism, 
which is tightly linked to anti-immigration views, has played a particularly 
strong role in British racism.  However, my focus here is not on whether we should use the word ‘racism’ in a way that includes anti-immigrant views, but 
rather how widely anti-immigrant views are thought of as racist. 
 
Whether or not it is true that anti-immigrant views are a form of racism, 
however, there are many people who do not view them as a form of racism.  For 
any such person, the Norm of Racial Equality will simply be seen as not applying 
to their views.  Moreover, there are many widely held views about the nature of 
racism that will seem to many to support the claim that particular forms of anti-
immigrant sentiment are not instances of racism. 
 
To see this, we will need to look both at the various forms that anti-immigrant 
sentiment can take and at why these may be seen as not-racist.  Here are just a 
few indicative examples. 
                                                                                                                                                              
negative attitudes toward some or all immigrants, which are the subject of this 
section.  
16 I discuss all this more fully in my forthcoming. 
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 Opposition to who are attempting to immigrate: Folk theories of racism 
tend to hold that racism must be about negative attitudes to either (a) 
people with a particular appearance, e.g. dark skin; or (b) people from a 
particular biologically or genetically defined group.  All immigrants is not 
a plausible racial category on either understanding, so such opposition won’t be seen as racism. One participant in a study of discourse around 
immigration said of opposition to asylum seekers: “It’s possibly approaching xenophobia, but it’s not racist” (Goodman and Burke 2010: 
4).  This is a nice illustration of the fact that xenophobia may well not be 
considered to be racist. 
 Opposition to Muslims: Again, this is widely not considered to be racism.  
Muslims may be of any skin colour or from any group, since anyone can 
convert to Islam.  Religious prejudice is far more socially acceptable than 
racial prejudice, as seen from polls showing that 42% of Americans are 
happy to declare that they would not consider an atheist for President 
(Fidalgo 2015).  
 Opposition to members of particular nationalities: this may seem a bit 
closer to folk understandings of racism, since members of particular 
nationalities may be seen as from a single broadly defined gene pool.  
(This is almost always false, but it may be thought to be true.)  And 
members of some nationalities—e.g. Mexicans in the US, Poles in the UK—
may be racialised.  Such prejudice will be more easily seen as racial if it is 
associated with traditional markers of racism, like negative atttiudes 
toward dark skin.  This would help anti-Mexican prejudice to be seen as 
racism, but it would make it more difficult for anti-Polish prejudice to be 
seen in this way.17  As with religious prejudice, national prejudice is much 
                                                        
17 Interestingly, Modood, writing in 2001, notes that what he called ‘cultural racism’ was mainly focused on those with darker skin colour, but that it could 
evolve to encompass prejudice against cultural groups with pale skin colour as 
well, which is arguably what has happened with the rise of anti-Eastern 
European prejudice in years preceding the referendum. 
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more socially acceptable than racism: patriotism, unlike white pride, is 
widely viewed as laudable. 
These complexities mean that (a) it is difficult to effectively criticize 
immigration-related utterances on grounds of racism, including both overt and 
covert dogwhistles.; and (b) there are highly effective figleaves readily available, 
even when anti-immigration sentiments are openly expressed.  Taken together, 
the result is that open expression of anti-immigration sentiment is far more 
socially acceptable that open expression of many other forms of prejudice, such 
as prejudice against black people. 
 Let’s take (a) first. Because of the Norm of Racial Equality, it had been (at least 
before the Obama Effect described above) thought to be relatively 
straightforward to defuse a racial dogwhistle.  Openly calling attention to the 
issue of racism was often enough, because this (1) triggered self-monitoring 
which stopped the operation of a covert dogwhistle and (2) laid bare what was 
really going on with an overt dogwhistle.  But when the topic is immigration 
matters are much murkier.  It is widely believed that anti-racism norms are not 
applicable to all forms of prejudice against immigrants, because that prejudice 
can take many forms, and some of these forms are not readily recognized as 
racism.   
 
For self-monitoring to be successful, it is only reasonable to suppose that it would need to be monitoring with respect to a norm that’s recognized as 
relevant to the utterance under discussion.18  Although mainstream media were dismissive of Jesse Jackson’s claim that the Willie Horton ad was racist, they did 
recognize that his claim (clearly about white-black racism) was relevant to the 
ad under discussion.  They would have been dismissive in an entirely different 
way if he had been arguing that the ad was offensively anti-Mormon. And the 
same is true for the white voters on whom the dogwhistle stopped working: they didn’t recognize the ad as racist, but they did see Jackson’s allegation as relevant 
enough to trigger self monitoring. This is because the targets matched: the ad did 
                                                        
18 In my forthcoming I call this Target Match. 
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feature a black man, so anti-black racism was clearly relevant, even if they felt 
the allegation was false.  Now take the case of an anti-immigrant ad featuring 
images of Muslims, and imagine that a campaigner argues that this is racist.  If 
the audience thinks that racism is a matter of prejudice based on skin colour, and 
also thinks that Muslims are a group united by beliefs rather than skin colour, 
this allegation may seem as irrelevant as our imaginary Jackson arguing that the 
Willie Horton ad is anti-Mormon.  Because it will seem irrelevant, it will not 
trigger self-monitoring of the sort needed to defuse a covert dogwhistle.  A 
similar dynamic will play out with an overt anti-immigration dogwhistle: once 
the hidden message is revealed, the audience would still need to be convinced 
that it is problematic.  Because most forms of anti-immigrant sentiment are not 
so widely recognized as either racist or otherwise problematic, it is more difficult 
to do this than it would be with more paradigmatic sorts of racism, such as white 
prejudice against black people.19 
 
Now on to (b)—the figleaves available for anti-immigrant utterances.  As we 
have seen, the particular groups who are the target of anti-immigrant sentiment 
may vary from speaker to speaker.  We have also seen that for most of these 
groups, significant numbers of people will not see opposition to or prejudice 
against these groups as violating anti-racism norms, or other widespread norms.  
Importantly, folk theories of racism tend to hold that (1) a racist will be equally 
prejudiced against all members of a group; and (2) racism is about groups picked 
out by skin colour, rather than nationality, immigration status, culture, or 
religion.  Both of these tenets of folk theory provide ample opportunity for 
figleaves. 
 
An excellent example of this comes from these remarks from Donald Trump: 
We have people coming into the country, or trying to come in 
— and we’re stopping a lot of them — but we’re taking people 
                                                        
19 For a fuller discussion of this, see my forthcoming. 
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out of the country. You wouldn’t believe how bad these people 
are. These aren’t people. These are animals.20 
 
This was quickly condemned as racism against immigrants, and indeed racism of 
a particularly dangerous kind—the sort of dehumanisation that particularly 
worries scholars of genocide21.  The defence of the remarks from the White 
House cited the full context, which included previous utterances specifically 
referring to gang members: 
SHERIFF (Margaret) MIMS (Fresno County, CA): Now ICE is 
the only law enforcement agency that cannot use our 
databases to find the bad guys. They cannot come in and talk 
to people in our jail, unless they reach a certain threshold [of 
being charged with a serious crime]. They can’t do all kinds of 
things that other law enforcement agencies can do. And it’s 
really put us in a very bad position. 
THE PRESIDENT: It’s a disgrace. Okay? It’s a disgrace. 
SHERIFF MIMS: It’s a disgrace. 
THE PRESIDENT: And we’re suing on that, and we’re working 
hard, and I think it will all come together, because people want 
it to come together. It’s so ridiculous. The concept that we’re 
even talking about is ridiculous. We’ll take care of it, Margaret. 
We’ll win. 
SHERIFF MIMS: Thank you. There could be an MS-13 
member I know about — if they don’t reach a certain threshold, 
I cannot tell ICE about it. 
THE PRESIDENT: We have people coming into the country, or 
trying to come in — and we’re stopping a lot of them — but 
we’re taking people out of the country. You wouldn’t believe 
how bad these people are. These aren’t people. These are 
animals. And we’re taking them out of the country at a level 
and at a rate that’s never happened before. And because of the 
                                                        
20 https://www.vox.com/2018/5/16/17362870/trump-immigrants-animals-
ms-13-illegal 
21 See, for example, Smith 2012. 
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weak laws, they come in fast, we get them, we release them, 
we get them again, we bring them out. It’s crazy. 
The defense holds that the prior context makes it clear that Trump was referring 
only to those immigrants who are gang members, and indeed members of MS-13.  
This is, arguably, a figleaf that works (when it does) because of the widespread 
belief that racism must be prejudice against all members of a particular group.  It would be racism, this line of thought goes, to call all immigrants “animals”.  But it 
is not racism to call those immigrants who are gang members “animals”.   
 
Dara Lind, however, does a nice job of exploring the difficulty of defending this 
particular remark in this way.  The defence relies on the idea that the group 
Trump is referring to is the same limited group that Sheriff Mims is referring to.  
But, Lind, points out, Mims is referring to people in local jails who have not been 
charged with a serious crime; while Trump is talking about people coming into 
the country.  Close scrutiny, then, shows that this really is a figleaf for a 
problematic remark, rather than a context which shows the remark not to be 
problematic.22 
 
Another feature of this case is also worth drawing attention to: this is the way 
that shocking or offensive remarks tend to get taken out of context and widely 
shared.  Whether or not Trump deliberately exploits this, the opportunity to 
exploit it is quite clear.  One way of conveying a message that is appealing to 
some voters and offensive to others is to make a blatantly offensive utterance 
and surround it with figleaves.  The offensive utterance will be widely shared 
without the figleaves—pleasing the voters that it appeals to; but the figleaves 
will there to refer back to in defense, placating at least some of those who might 





otherwise have been inclined to turn against one.23  Moreover, their presence in 
the original remarks offers an opportunity to condemn those concerned about 
the remarks as misleadingly taking a quote out of context. 
 
Immigration, then, is an ideal topic for a politician to discuss via dogwhistles or 
figleaves.  Moreover, the weakness of norms against anti-immigration 
sentiments, and the variation in groups targeted by anti-immigration sentiments 
mean that these may not even be necessary- and when they are used it will be 
especially hard to defuse them.  It is no surprise that anti-immigration sentiment 
has been such a potent force in recent years. 
 
2.4 So, what is happening to our norms against racist speech? 
The use of figleaves and dogwhistles quite obviously enables the expression of 
racist sentiments.  Covert racist dogwhistles mobilise racist sentiments to 
influence voting (and other behavior), which has dramatic and dangerous effects 
on our world.  Overt racist dogwhistles—like triple parentheses— 
 can enable white supremacists to find each other and their objects of hate, and 
to organize in ways that they might not otherwise be able to—and this potential 
is greatly enhanced by the worldwide reach of social media.  Dogwhistles, then, 
work around the Norm of Racial Equality by making many people unaware that it 
is being violated. 
 
But figleaves are pernicious in a different way: they may cause changes to our 
interpretation and application of the Norm of Racial Equality.  Take an otherwise 
obviously racist utterance, R, accompanied by a figleaf.  For those who accept the 
figleaf, R is now seen as the sort of thing that a non-racist might say.  So, for example, those who accept Donald Trump’s figleaf, “Mexicans are rapists” 
becomes thought of as something a non-racist might say.  In other words, 
                                                        
23 This is not just a phenomenon of the social media age.  Nightly news 
broadcasts and newspapers have also had a tendency to focus on the shocking 
out-of-context quotes.   
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figleaves have a particular ability to change what we count as racism.  They work around the Norm of Racial Equality by changing people’s views about what 
counts as violating it. 
 
As a result of dogwhistles, figleaves, and their role our current political moment., 
views on what counts as racism are changing—but not in a simple way.  Importantly, they are changing in different ways for different groups.  (We’ll see 
that this is very much what one would expect, given the workings of the 
techniques we have discussed). One illustrative way to see this is to look at 
attitudes toward the n-word.  Between 2006 and 2018, the percentage of 
Republicans who found the n-word offensive declined from 49% to 43%; and the percentage of Republicans who think it’s never acceptable for white people to 
use the n-word declined from 65% to 57%.  Meanwhile, however, Democratic 
attitudes have also changed.  The percentage of Democrats who find it offensive increased from 55% to 75%; and the percentage who think it’s never acceptable 
for white people to use it increased from 71% to 84%.24 
 
At first, this polarization might seem surprising: one might expect that the 
increased frequency of blatantly racist utterances would simply serve to 
habituate white voters to overtly racist utterances, which would make uses of 
the n-word less offensive for all white voters.  But the story of how our standards 
of racism change crucially involves the role of figleaves: blatantly racist 
utterances come to be seen as not indicators of racism only when their figleaves 
are accepted.  And the figleaves are not accepted by all voters.  The acceptance of 
figleaves covering blatant racism can explain why Republicans are less likely to 
take the usage of particular terms as indicators of racism.  But at the same time, 
other white voters—generally Democrats—are emphatically not accepting the 
fig leaves.  Instead, they are appalled by the rise in obviously racist speech, and 






reject the figleaves as transparent efforts to cover for racial hatred.  This explains 
why Democratic voters are moving in the opposite direction.  Because fig leaves 
succeed for some voters and not others, this polarization makes sense.  (It is, of 
course, further enhanced by the ways in which different groups of voters 
increasingly follow entirely different media (Pariser 2011; Iyengar et. al. 2009), 
and by the fact that racially resentful voters have increasingly moved from the 
Democratic to the Republican party (Sides et. al. 2018).)   
 
It might seem that these changes cancel each other out—and if one looks at the 
overall picture, in fact more people find use of the n-word unacceptable now 
than in 2006.  But it would be a great mistake to be overly reassured by this.  It is 
indeed a very good thing that Democrats are increasingly concerned about 
racism- and it is clear (as I argued in my 2017) that the blatant racist language 
facilitated by figleaves has helped to galvanise the anti-Trump resistance in the 
US.  But it is no small matter that nearly half of Republicans think that the n-word 
is not offensive, and almost two thirds of them think it’s acceptable to use it.  This means that one of the US’s two major political parties is increasingly accepting of 
what was previously recognized as a paradigm case of racial hate speech.   
 
The worries are enhanced when we consider the growing movement to embrace the label ‘racist’ (and other similar labels). Steve Bannon, leading figure of white 
nationalism, said the following at a conference of the National Front in France: “Let them call you racists. Let them call you xenophobes. Let them call you nativists”25 
The idea that one should not be concerned about the label ‘racist’ undermines 
not just interpretations of the Norm of Racial Equality, but endorsement of the 
norm itself.  The other moves we have seen allow one to circumvent the norm 







when certain groups of speakers are let to believe there is nothing racial going on (with dogwhistles), or to defend against worries that maybe what’s been said 
indicates racism (with figleaves).  But they left intact the norm that one should 
avoid being racist.  This norm was not nearly as action-guiding as one might like, 
but it nonetheless meant that some form of subterfuge was necessary, which provided some degree of check on what one could get away with.  If ‘racist’ is 
embraced, all bets are off.  Significantly, Bannon also took the time to suggest 
embracing the other labels, which (we have seen) might apply more clearly to 
anti-immigration prejudice where that is not readily seen as racism.  He wants to 
make sure that all of these forms of bigotry become increasingly acceptable. 
 
And yet—even as he does this he provides a tissue-thin figleaf.  He does not say ‘be racist’.  Instead, he says not to worry when others call you ‘racist’.  This 
allows him, and any would-be supporter, to argue that he hasn’t endorsed racism; he’s just saying not to worry about what people call you.  This allows 
him, and any would-be supporter, to still not see the Norm of Racial Equality as 
violated—even as he directly attacks it.  
 
What is happening, then, to our norms against racist speech?  For the moment, 
mostly, these norms still seem to be in place.  Indeed, they are still strongly and 
widely held.  However, they have always been norms with very substantial 
excuses and get-out clauses built in.  Figleaves have allowed Trump (and others 
on the far right) to make openly racist utterances, and to have them accepted as 
not racist.  This has meant (a) a disturbing shift in what counts as racist; and (b) 
an increasing habituation to racist utterances.  If this continues, one would 
expect that eventually figleaves may not be necessary, and the Norm of Racial 
Equality might well be abandoned.  This would mean that being racist comes to be seen as acceptable.  We see signs of this already, in Steve Bannon’s utterances, 
and in the spread of White Nationalism.  However, we also see countervailing 
forces in the strength of the resistance that has mobilized in response to the open 
racism of the Trump era, and its electoral successes in 2018.  We live in an 
uncertain time, and it is not yet clear where we are headed. 
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